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INTRODUCTION 
While the American dream is as varied as the people that comprise 
this nation, many would agree that one of the pillars of that dream is 
home ownership.  In light of the Qur’an’s prohibition against paying 
interest,1 homeownership remains nothing more than a dream for many 
Muslims living in America.  This Article explores how a Muslim in 
America can purchase a home with mortgage alternatives specifically 
tailored to meet his needs, and how these mortgage alternatives can be 
executed to avoid becoming a clog on the equitable right of redemption.  
While these mortgage alternatives are not without critics, courts and 
regulatory agencies should nevertheless encourage their development 
because: (1) the Islamic mortgagor’s equitable right of redemption is 
protected, either through contract rights or through the functional 
equivalent to mortgages; and (2) on balance, these mortgage alternatives 
help a growing segment of the population realize the American dream. 
To fully explore this issue, Part I of this Article begins with a 
thorough discussion of the equitable right of redemption, why 
mortgagees cannot clog that right, and how the courts of equity 
determine if that right should be given to a borrower.  Part II explores 
the reasons why Muslims face difficulties in the housing market and 
how lending institutions are responding to meet the needs of these 
particular consumers.  Part II also details two proposed types of 
mortgage alternatives available to Muslims, the regulatory responses to 
them, and addresses challenges from critics.  Part III applies a two-step 
analysis to determine whether the proposed alternatives are equitable 
mortgages and, if so, whether they clog the borrower’s equity of 
redemption.  Lastly, Part IV highlights appropriate means to ameliorate 
the dangers these alternatives may pose and the benefits these 
alternatives offer to Islamic mortgagors. 
I.  THE EQUITABLE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION 
The mortgage, which originated in fourteenth century England,2 
commonly consisted of a borrower (“mortgagor”) giving a deed in fee 
 1. Qur’an 2:275; see also infra text accompanying notes 58-62. 
 2. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 645 (5th ed. 2002); see also 
C.C. Williams, Clogging the Equity of Redemption, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 31, 32 (1933). 
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simple to a lender (“mortgagee”), with a condition subsequent provision 
(“defeasance clause”) stipulating that if the mortgagor repaid the debt on 
the given due date (“law day”), the deed would defease and the title 
would revert back to the mortgagor.3  Under the mortgage, the 
mortgagee was entitled to possession of the real property and he could 
collect any rents and apply them to the debt.4  Ironically, the reason for 
the mortgagee’s entitlement to rents was the Church’s prohibition on 
paying interest during this period.5  The harsh reality of the time was 
that if the mortgagor failed to repay the debt on law day, then the 
mortgagee would own the real property in fee simple absolute and the 
defeasance clause would no longer be valid.6  Since the land was 
generally worth more than the debt, the mortgagee received a windfall.7
In response to the mortgagee’s perceived unjust enrichment, 
mortgagors began to petition the chancery courts to use its equitable 
powers to permit delinquent mortgagors another opportunity to pay the 
debt and reclaim their real property.8  The chancellors responded by 
finding “that prompt payment was not of sufficient importance to justify 
the debtor losing the property when the lender could be compensated by 
an award of money . . .”9 and, therefore, created the equitable right of 
redemption to cure this disparate inequity.10  While initially the 
chancellors only allowed for redemption to prevent “great injustice[s],” 
by the seventeenth century the equitable right of redemption was well 
 3. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 645; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. a (1997); Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing 
Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 322-29 (1987). 
 4. Lou J. Viverito, Comment, The Shared Appreciation Mortgage: A Clog on the 
Equity of Redemption?, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 131, 144 (1982) (citing ROBERT 
KRAVTOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 24 (1972)). 
 5. For the Biblical prohibitions against paying interest, see Deuteronomy 23:19-20 
(stating, “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; . . . Unto a stranger thou 
mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury”); Exodus 
22:25 (noting, “If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you are not to 
act as a creditor to him; you shall not charge him”); Leviticus 25:35 (commanding, “Do 
not take usurious interest from him, but revere your God, that your countryman may 
live with you.  You shall not give him your silver at interest”); Luke 6:35 (admonishing 
Christians, “Lend freely, hoping nothing thereby”). 
 6. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 645. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Viverito, supra note 4, at 145. 
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established as a matter of course and right.11  As a result of this new 
equitable right, the delinquent mortgagor was permitted to sue in equity 
to redeem his property.12  Upon payment of the debt with interest, the 
chancellor would compel the mortgagee to convey the land to the 
mortgagor.13
Naturally, the mortgagee did not react favorably to the birth of 
these new debtor-protection rights.14  Under the new protection scheme, 
the mortgagee remained in danger of losing the real property even after 
the mortgagor’s default.15  Once again, acting in equity, the chancellors 
promulgated a second new right: strict foreclosure and, later, the 
foreclosure sale.16  Under the right of strict foreclosure, the mortgagee 
could petition the chancery court to extinguish the mortgagor’s equitable 
right of redemption, thereby assuring the mortgagee that his real 
property would not be redeemed at some later date.17  Once the 
chancellor granted the strict foreclosure, the mortgagor was ordered to 
pay the debt within a specific time frame or suffer the loss of the 
property forever.18  As new equitable rights evolved, the chancellors 
created the judicial foreclosure sale whereby the court held a public sale 
to dispose of the real property.19  Under the terms of the judicial 
foreclosure sale, the court paid the mortgagee from the sale proceeds to 
extinguish the outstanding mortgage debt and then remitted any excess 
to the mortgagor.20  If the foreclosure property failed to sell for an 
adequate amount to extinguish the mortgage debt, the mortgagee could 
sue the mortgagor for the deficiency.21
While strict foreclosure and the foreclosure sale brought some 
finality to the mortgagee, it was a costly endeavor.22  In order to 
circumvent the equity courts and to take advantage of their superior 
 11. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 645. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See RESTATEMENT¸ supra note 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 646 (explaining that, with the 
institution of new equitable rights, comes increasing costs of foreclosure for the 
mortgagee). 
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bargaining position, mortgagees began inserting waiver clauses whereby 
the mortgagor agreed to forego his redemption rights.23  The chancery 
courts refused to enforce these clauses, however, holding that the 
equitable right of redemption could not be waived.24  The first use of 
“clog” to describe the mortgagees’ actions is found in Bacon v. Bacon 
from 1639, “where the mortgagee will suddenly bestow unnecessary 
costs upon the mortgaged lands, of purposes to clogg [sic] the lands, to 
prevent the mortgagor’s redemption . . . .”25  Thus, over time, the 
clogging principle established itself in the common law, ultimately 
migrating to the American colonies where it enjoys the same 
protections.26
The most recent version of the Restatement of Property describes 
the equity of redemption as “[f]rom the time the full obligation secured 
by a mortgage becomes due and payable until the mortgage is 
foreclosed, a mortgagor has the right to redeem the mortgaged real estate 
from the encumbrance of the mortgage by tendering payment or 
performance of the obligation to the mortgagee.”27  Likewise, it 
incorporates the prohibition against clogging in the next subsection by 
stating that “[a]ny agreement in or created contemporaneously with a 
mortgage that impairs the mortgagor’s right described [in the 
Restatement] is ineffective.”28
The U.S. Supreme Court highlighted similar language in the late 
nineteenth century: “This right [of redemption] cannot be waived or 
abandoned by any stipulation of the parties made at the time, even if 
embodied in the mortgage.  This is a doctrine from which a court of 
equity never deviates.”29  While the Court clearly recognized the 
importance of the equity of redemption, it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over state mortgage law and only heard this controversy 
because it had appellate jurisdiction in the District of Columbia at that 
time.30
 23. See Viverito, supra note 4, at 145. 
 24. Id. at 147. 
 25. Id. at 146 (citing Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (1639)). 
 26. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.1(b). 
 29. Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 337 (1877). 
 30. See generally United States v. Belt, 319 U.S. 521 (1943) (discussing the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court over the District of Columbia). 
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For each new method mortgagees devise to emasculate the equity 
of redemption, the courts of equity attempt to keep pace.  In analyzing 
whether a real estate financing arrangement is a clog on the equity of 
redemption, the majority of the courts of equity hold to the centuries-old 
maxim “once a mortgage, always a mortgage.”31  The courts generally 
follow a two-step analysis under this premise.32  First, the courts of 
equity ask if the arrangement creates an equitable mortgage.  If the 
chancellor determines that one exists, she examines whether the 
arrangement clogs the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property before a 
valid foreclosure.33  In answering the threshold question, the chancellors 
are not bound by how the parties label the transaction because 
“[e]quity’s vision is not circumscribed by formal instruments, but 
extends through matters of form to the heart of the transaction.”34  They 
rely on multiple factors to determine whether an equitable mortgage 
exists; however, the principle element is whether the agreement creates 
an underlying debt.35
Generally, the existence of an underlying debt is sufficient for 
equitable courts to find that an equitable mortgage exists.  If it is unclear 
whether debt exists, courts consider less prominent factors, including: 
(1) the relationship of the parties; (2) whether legal assistance was 
available; (3) the sophistication and circumstances of each party; (4) the 
adequacy of the consideration; (5) whether the borrower retained 
possession of the property; (6) the statements of the parties; and (7) 
whether the borrower acted as an owner (i.e., whether he paid property 
taxes, made improvements, etc.).36  This is not an exhaustive list, but it 
 31. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Doerr, 303 A.2d 898, 905 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1973); accord Cousins v. Crawford, 63 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 1953); Bergerding Inv. Co. v. 
Larson, 170 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn. 1969); Rice v. Wood, 346 S.E.2d 205, 211 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1986); Conley v. Henderson, 75 P.2d 746, 750 (Or. 1938); Odenbaugh v. 
Bradford, 67 Pa. 96, 96 (Pa. 1870); Holmes v. Basham, 45 S.E.2d 252, 256 (W. Va. 
1947). 
 32. See generally Humble Oil, 303 A.2d at 905 (establishing a general trend of 
applying a two-step analysis). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Bergerding Inv. Co., 170 N.W.2d at 326. 
 35. Grant v. Pattison, 371 P.2d 870, 873 (Mont. 1962) (citing 1 JONES ON 
MORTGAGES § 316, p. 386-87 (5th ed. 1894) (explaining “the existence of the debt is 
the test”); see also Flack v. McClure, 565 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting 
the existence of a debt as the “essential element” in determining whether an equitable 
mortgage exists). 
 36. See Flack, 565 N.E.2d at 136 (listing six factors that trial courts should 
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encompasses the majority of factors applied by courts of equity.  Once a 
court determines that a financing arrangement is an equitable mortgage 
under these factors, it should ask whether the arrangement is a clog on 
the equity of redemption.37
Over the centuries, ingenious mortgagees sought means to 
minimize the protections of the equity of redemption.  Once the equity 
courts struck down the mortgagee’s waiver attempts, the mortgagees 
turned to clauses that restricted the length of time a mortgagor had to 
redeem.38  The courts of equity acted decisively to invalidate these 
restrictions.39  Subsequently, the mortgagees attempted to use options, 
which the mortgagee could exercise to take title to the real property if 
the mortgagor defaulted.40  These actions were ruled as clogs for two 
reasons: (1) the option allowed for the mortgagee to acquire title without 
having to maintain a foreclosure action; and (2) the policy 
considerations against permitting the use of options in this manner are so 
strong, they are absolutely void and unenforceable, regardless of 
whether actual oppression exists in the specific case.41  Similarly, 
chancellors prohibited practices in which the mortgagor gave an 
consider to determine whether an equitable mortgage exists); see also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 3, § 3.3(b)(1)-(7) (listing seven factors used to determine whether a contract 
for deed is an equitable mortgage). 
 37. See Humble Oil, 303 A.2d at 905. 
 38. See Viverito, supra note 4, at 147 (citing generally the following cases where 
time restrictions on mortgage redemption after default were held invalid: Frazer v. 
Couthy Land Co., 149 A. 428 (Del. Ch. 1929) (three years); Bradley v. Davenport, 46 
P. 1062 (Cal. 1896) (four months); Stover v. Bounds, 1 Ohio St. 107 (Ohio 1853) 
(before a fixed date); and Floyer v. Lavington, 24 Eng. Rep. 384 (1714) (for the life of 
mortgagor)). 
 39. See Frazer, 149 A. at 429 (invalidating the three-year time restriction for 
redemption because “it appears to be settled that a right to redeem continues at all times 
until it is foreclosed”); Bradley, 46 P. at 1065 (invalidating time limit by looking to the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction); see also Stover, 1 Ohio St. at 110 (holding 
that an assignee of the mortgage held an equitable claim to title of the land). 
 40. See Viverito, supra note 4, at 147; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at cmt. 
b, illus. (providing several examples of clog and non-clog language). 
 41. Humble Oil, 303 A.2d at 906 (citing numerous sources concerning the history, 
rationale and public policy behind options as clogs on the equity of redemption); see 
also Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Corp., [1904] A.C. 323 (H.L.) (affirming 
that an option, even if fair and taken at an arms-length transaction, was invalid as an 
impermissible clog); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.1 cmt. d (noting that an overly 
dogmatic approach to options should be avoided where the option is being used to clog 
the mortgagor’s equitable right of redemption). 
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absolute deed to the mortgagee with the tacit understanding that the 
mortgagee would only record the deed should the mortgagor default, 
holding such practice to be an impermissible clog on the equity of 
redemption.42
[The] maintenance [of the doctrine] is deemed essential to the 
protection of the debtor, who, under pressing necessities, will submit 
to ruinous conditions waiving the equity of redemption allowed him 
or her on breach of his or her obligation, in the expectation and hope 
of repaying the loan at the stipulated time and thus preventing 
forfeiture.43
Two notable devices are critical to identifying clogs on the equity 
of redemption.  First, the installment land contract is a lending device 
that makes time of the essence and the borrower’s (“vendee”) 
acquisition of title conditional upon full satisfaction of the debt.44  In 
some jurisdictions, these distinctions have been deemed sufficient to 
remove these instruments from the mortgage protections and place them 
within the scope of contract law.45  The installment land contract’s 
forfeiture clause grants the vendor the power to cancel the contract, 
retake possession of the real property, and claim the vendee’s payments 
as liquidated damages.46  While the installment land contract may 
initially appear to be clog on the equity of redemption, it serves a 
valuable purpose within the housing market.  Furthermore, many states’ 
equitable courts have held that the installment land contract, because it is 
governed by contract law and not mortgage law, is not a clog.47  This 
method of financing is exceedingly popular with low-income 
mortgagors who may not otherwise satisfy the traditional mortgage’s 
 42. See, e.g., Smith v. Headlee, 183 P. 20 (Or. 1919); see also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 3. 
 43. Smith, 183 P. 20 at 22. 
 44. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, & 
DEVELOPMENT 284 (2003); see also Frank R. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 
21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 477 (1973) (stating that “resort to the installment contract device is 
usually attributed to the unavailability of mortgage financing for very low down 
payment sales and to the supposed ease of terminating the purchaser’s interest in the 
property in the event of default”). 
 45. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.4 cmt. a; see also Roger A. Cunningham 
& Saul Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions As Mortgages in 
Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (1972-73). 
 46. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.4 cmt. a. 
 47. See Cunningham & Tischler, supra note 45, at 7. 
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credit and down payment requirements.48  Lenders prefer this method in 
states where judicial foreclosure sales are the only means of terminating 
a mortgagor’s equity of redemption.49  However, a growing number of 
jurisdictions and the Restatement view this arrangement as analogous to 
an equitable mortgage, with all of its protections.50
The deed in lieu of foreclosure is the second notable lending 
transaction not considered a clog on the equity of redemption51 because 
it is given subsequent to the closing of the mortgage.52  A deed in lieu of 
foreclosure terminates the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship after the 
mortgagor defaults, but before the equity of redemption is foreclosed.53  
The mortgagor conveys a deed to the mortgagee in return for the 
mortgagee’s release of the mortgagor from the debt.54  As a result, the 
defaulting mortgagor preserves his creditworthiness and avoids defense 
costs in foreclosure and deficiency proceedings.55  Mortgagees seek 
deeds in lieu of foreclosure to avoid the expense of initiating the 
foreclosure proceedings.56  Courts closely scrutinize any subsequent 
conveyance, however, to ensure that the transaction is adequately 
supported by consideration and is free from fraud and oppression.57
The equity of redemption has endured as one of the major pillars of 
mortgage law for over seven centuries.  While mortgagees have striven 
to nullify its protections, the courts of equity have guarded this right 
faithfully.  The doctrine reflects the equitable courts’ understanding of 
the disparity in the parties’ bargaining positions and attempts to inject a 
basic level of fairness into the stream of housing commerce. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.4 cmt. a. 
 50. See id. § 3.4 cmt. b (“Some view this right as an unconditional and the 
equivalent of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, while others condition the right on 
the purchaser’s prior payments having been sufficient to create a substantial equity in 
the property,” with the purchaser’s ability to redeem dependent upon whether the 
payments already made exceed the fair rental value of the real estate.  Those guilty of 
gross negligence or bad faith may be barred from redemption). 
 51. See generally DUKEMENIER & KRIER, supra note 2. 
 52. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at cmt. f; see also John C. Murray, Clogging 
Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279, 287-89 (1998-1999). 
 53. See Murray, supra note 52. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 287. 
 57. Id. at 288. 
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II.  ISLAM AND INTEREST 
Home ownership remains elusive for many Muslims because Islam 
forbids its followers from either paying or receiving interest.  This 
prohibition arose during the early years of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
teaching when usurious loans were rampant and the failure to repay a 
debt often resulted in slavery.58  “By outlawing interest, Islam advocated 
an economy based on risk-sharing, fair dealing, and equity – in both the 
financial and social – justice senses of the word.”59  The Qur’an clearly 
and simply warns its followers that “God has forbidden riba.”60  While 
the Qur’an does not expressly define riba, the Sunna, which is the 
second most influential religious authority,61 states that “[e]very loan 
that attracts a benefit is riba.”62  Therefore, devout Muslims are unable 
to obtain traditional interest-bearing loans to purchase homes and must 
instead rely upon savings or non-interest loans from friends and 
relatives. 
Considering that the average price of homes in 2006 was 
approximately $169,000,63 the non-financing home buyer must sacrifice 
years of equity-building in order to save a sufficient amount to purchase 
property outright.  Furthermore, the non-home owner loses not only tax 
benefits,64 but also familial and societal advantages.65  The 
Homeownership Alliance asserts essentially four primary social benefits 
to homeownership: (1) advantages to children, including higher 
 58. Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah: Devout Muslims Don’t Pay or Receive 
Interest. So How Can Their Financial System Work?, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002, at 145. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Qur’an 2:275. 
 61. Michael Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early 
History of Regulatory Arbitrage 13 (U. Pa. Law Sch., Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper 
No. 49, 2004), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/49. 
 62. Id. (referring to the passage of the Sunna that most clearly states the definition 
of riba). 
 63. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD ECON. STATISTICS DIV., 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY/HOUSING VACANCY SURVEY, TBL. 11A (2008), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histt11.html. 
 64. I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006) (allowing home owners to deduct interest from their 
adjusted gross income). 
 65. ROBERT D. DIETZ, HOMEOWNERSHIP ALLIANCE, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 3 (2003), available at http://www.newtowncdc.org/pdf/social_conseq 
uences_study.pdf. 
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academic performance and lower instances of behavioral problems; (2) 
higher civic participation; (3) greater overall health and happiness; and 
(4) enhanced property values.66  Muslims who cannot raise sufficient 
resources to purchase a home outright are forced to choose between 
rejecting piety or sacrificing the benefits of home ownership.  Therefore, 
many Muslims are losing out on a critical aspect of the American dream. 
In response to the religious barriers to home ownership for 
Muslims, lending institutions have begun seeking ways to meet the 
needs of this expanding community.67  There are many variations of 
alternative lending methods; this Article analyzes two proposals 
submitted to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
representing the basic arrangements available.68
A.  The United Bank of Kuwait’s Net Lease Proposal 
The United Bank of Kuwait (“UBK”) brought the first proposal for 
Islamic-centered mortgage alternatives to the OCC in 1997.69  UBK 
wished “to offer Net Leases to meet the special needs of its customers 
who adhere to the principles of Islam.”70  Under the UBK Net Lease 
program, the lessee will select a home and agree to a purchase price with 
the seller.71  Next, the lessee will enter into a Net Lease Agreement and 
a Purchase Agreement (collectively “the Agreements”) where the lender 
will agree to purchase the home and serve as landlord, and the lessee 
will make a monthly payment which will comprise principal, rent, taxes, 
 66. See id. at 13. 
 67. While this article will focus on the United Bank of Kuwait’s Net Lease 
Proposal in Interpretive Letter No. 806 and the murabaha proposed in Interpretive 
Letter No. 867, these are not the only lenders providing alternative mortgages to 
Muslims.  For a discussion of alternate lending methods, see Bill Maurer, Articulating 
Islamic Knowledge to an American Dream: Islamic Home Financing Alternatives After 
September 11, 2001, 26 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOL. REV. 196 (2003). 
 68. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, 
http://www.occ.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).  The OCC charters, 
regulates, and supervises all national banks and all federal branches of foreign banking 
institutions. Id. 
 69. Interpretive Letter No. 806, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 81,253 (Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency Oct. 17, 1997) [hereinafter 
Interpretive Letter No. 806], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/dec97/int80 
6.pdf (pagination, infra, consistent with URL source). 
 70. Id. at 1. 
 71. Id. 
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and insurance components.72  UBK will add its cost of funds, as 
determined by the London Interbank Offering Rate (“LIBOR”), at the 
start of the lease.73  While UBK will retain legal title, the lessee shall 
have the right of possession to the home for a specified number of 
years.74  The lessee will be responsible for maintaining the property and 
paying the expenses normally associated with purchaser’s 
responsibilities.75  Under the payment terms, the principal amount will 
amortize over the term of the lease.76  Once the principal sum is fully 
amortized, UBK will transfer title to the home to the lessee 
automatically.77
The Agreements also permit the lessee to prepay the principal and 
acquire title to the property early.78  In the event that the lessee 
materially defaults under the Agreements, UBK will have remedies 
similar to those under a traditional mortgage.79  UBK will provide notice 
to the lessee of default and allow a period to cure the default;80 however, 
if the lessee fails to cure within that time frame, UBK will terminate the 
lease and treat the property as if it had been acquired in foreclosure.81
In advocating its proposal, UBK argued that the transaction would 
be functionally equivalent in economic substance to a secured real 
property transaction.82  To support its argument that the transaction 
would be functionally equivalent to traditional real estate financing, 
UBK intended to carry the loans on its financial records as financing, 
rather than leasing, in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (“GAAP”).83  Furthermore, UBK anticipated that the Internal 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  The Interpretive Letter is silent as to how UBK will transfer title or when it 
would deliver the deed to the lessee. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. at 1-2; see also INCEPTION OF THE LEASE, Statement of Fin. Accounting 
Standards No. 23 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978), http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas2 
3.pdf (discussing the generally accepted accounting principles for leases); ACCOUNTING 
FOR LEASES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 98 (Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd. 1988), http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas98.pdf. 
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Revenue Service would treat the transaction as a financing agreement, 
allowing the lessee to deduct the imputed interest portion of the lease 
payment on their tax filings.84  Essentially, for accounting and tax 
purposes UBK would treat the transaction as a traditional interest-
bearing loan, but the Islamic lessee would regard the transaction as a 
non-interest-bearing lease-to-own agreement, while also receiving the 
advantages of home ownership.85
In analyzing whether UBK’s proposal was appropriate under the 
current regulatory scheme, the OCC turned to the National Banking Act 
(“Bank Act”),86 which authorizes the OCC to regulate domestic 
branches of foreign banks and enumerates the following powers of 
national banks: 
[t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to 
carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating 
promissory notes, . . . and other evidence of debt; by receiving 
deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by 
loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and 
circulating notes . . . (emphasis added).87
In NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Life Annuity 
Insurance Co., the U.S. Supreme Court broadly interpreted the “business 
of banking” to extend beyond these powers88 and added that the OCC 
has discretion to “authorize activities beyond those specifically 
enumerated.”89  In determining whether a proposed activity is within the 
“business of banking,” the OCC relies upon three general principles: (1) 
whether the proposal is “functionally equivalent” or logically follows an 
approved activity;90 (2) whether the proposal is responsive and/or 
 84. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 3; see also I.R.C. § 7701(l) 
(2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe regulations re-
characterizing any multiple-party financing transaction as a transaction directly among 
any two or more of such parties where the Secretary determines that such re-
characterization is appropriate to prevent avoidance of any tax imposed by this title”); 
I.R.C §§ 1271-1276 (2006) (discussing imputed interest for debt instruments).
 85. See generally Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69. 
 86. National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 371 (2006). 
 87. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 3 (quoting the Bank Act). 
 88. NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Life Annuity Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 
258 (1995). 
 89. Id. at 258, n. 2. 
 90. Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 4; see, e.g., Merchants’ Bank v. 
State Bank, 77 U.S. 604 (1871); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1988); 
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beneficial to the bank’s customers;91 and (3) whether the bank is 
assuming new risks.92
In adhering to these statutory and judicial mandates, the OCC 
concluded that the proposal fell within the ambit of the Bank Act 
because it was “functionally equivalent to or a logical outgrowth of 
secured lending.”93  After examining the actual accounting, regulatory, 
and tax effects of the proposed transaction the OCC opined that: 
UBK’s Net Lease proposal responds to the special issues regarding 
Islamic customers by providing an alternative method for a discrete 
group to get access to credit without forcing them to choose between 
their religion and home ownership.  It allows followers of Islam to 
purchase homes without violating Islamic proscriptions on 
borrowing money on which interest is charged.  Furthermore, UBK’s 
Net Lease proposal is consistent with the well-established public 
policy of encouraging home ownership.94
In approving UBK’s proposal, the OCC opened the door for Islamic 
mortgagors to remain true to their religious tenets while simultaneously 
enjoying the benefits of homeownership. 
B.  UBK’s Net Lease Proposal Is a Clog of the Mortgagor’s 
Equity of Redemption 
Two years later, the OCC reaffirmed its commitment to lending 
flexibility when it approved a second lending institution’s proposal to 
offer murabaha financing products.95  Murabaha is akin to a cost-plus-
profit financing arrangement where the lender essentially functions as a 
“riskless principal,” or quasi-agent.96  Here, the lender purchases the 
home on behalf of the borrower and then resells the home to the 
M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 91. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 9. 
 92. Id.; see, e.g., Merchants’ Nat’l Bank, 77 U.S. 604 (1871); Am. Ins. Ass’n, 865 
F.2d 278 (2nd Cir. 1988); M & M Leasing Corp., 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 93. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 4. 
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Interpretive Letter No. 867, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 81,361 (Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency June 1, 1999) [hereinafter 
Interpretive Letter No. 867], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/nov99/int86 
7.pdf (pagination, infra, consistent with URL source) (agreeing that murabaha 
financing transactions are permissible). 
 96. Id. at 1. 
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borrower at an agreed upon profit.  Under the terms of the agreement, 
the borrower remits a down payment to the lender, which is not to 
exceed 25%, and finances the difference.97  Using a recognized market 
index, such as LIBOR, the lender determines the profit by calculating 
the present value of the interest payments, like a traditional interest-
bearing mortgage, and adds that amount to the debt. 98  The borrower 
makes equal installment payments based on the cost-plus-profit amount 
until the debt is fully amortized.99
Once the closing has occurred the lender records the title with a 
senior mortgage (or deed of trust) on the property.100  In the event the 
borrower defaults under the murabaha contract, the lender may 
foreclose on the real property as it would under a traditional real estate 
transaction.101  In addition to the foreclosure, the lender may seek a 
judgment for any deficiency between the balance due and the contract 
amount.102
The OCC determined that the murabaha proposal was functionally 
equivalent to conventional financing transactions and approved the 
proposal, as it had the Net Lease proposal.103  Based largely on its earlier 
decision in favor of UBK,104 the OCC found that the murabaha 
transaction would be treated as a secured lending transaction for 
accounting, regulatory, and tax purposes and was within the scope of the 
approved policies of the Bank Act.105
C.  Criticisms of the Islamic Mortgage Alternatives 
Even though the OCC, banks, and a growing number of consumers 
embrace the Net Lease and murabaha, these mortgage alternatives are 
not without their critics.  Some argue that “the ‘Islamic Bank’ is a 
 97. Id. at 4. 
 98. Id. at 2-3. 
 99. Id. at 5. 
 100. Id. at 4. 
 101. Id. at 5. 
 102. Id. at 5.  The OCC’s Interpretive Letter does not discuss the applicability of any 
anti-deficiency statutes.  The OCC may have assumed that the jurisdiction of the lender 
either did not have such a statute or that the statute would be inapplicable in this 
instance. 
 103. Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69. 
 104. See Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 6 (referencing precedent 
decision in Interpretive Letter 806, supra note 69). 
 105. Id. 
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Trojan horse which has been infiltrated into Dar al-Islam106. . . . [It] is a 
totally crypto-usurious institution and like all other usurious institutions 
must be rejected and fought.”107  On their faces, the Net Lease and 
murabaha appear to be interest-free financing products; however, some 
strict interpreters argue that “the ‘fees,’ ‘mark-ups,’ and ‘profit-sharing’ 
of Islamic transactions are a thinly veiled subterfuge for interest.”108
The assertions that these mortgage alternatives are merely “thinly 
veiled” interest transactions are concededly valid, and supported by 
traditional notions and understandings of economic thought.  Interest is 
essentially the cost applied for borrowing money.109  The Net Lease 
veils its interest charge in the term “rent,”110 whereas the murabaha 
similarly disguises its interest in the profit tacked on to the principal 
amount at the start of the relationship.111  Without these two components 
of the payment, however, the lenders would fail to realize a profit on the 
transaction and would be unwilling to lend money.  While the arguments 
for and against Islamic mortgage alternatives are cogent, whether an 
interpretation is correct is a question of one’s faith and is beyond the 
scope of this inquiry. 
III.  RECONCILING ISLAMIC MORTGAGE ALTERNATIVES WITH THE 
EQUITABLE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION 
While the OCC’s imprimatur went a long way in helping Muslims 
obtain flexible financing methods, neither it nor the proposing banks 
addressed what effect these proposals would have on the equity of 
redemption.  One fundamental objective of the equity of redemption is 
to protect the mortgagor from the superior bargaining power of the 
mortgagee.112  This basic concern is even more apposite when 
 106. MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM, CONSCIENCE AND 
HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION I: THE CLASSICAL AGE OF ISLAM 513 (1974).  “Dar 
al-Islam: lands under Muslim rule . . . converse of Dar al-Harb, i.e., lands under non-
Muslim rule.” Id. 
 107. Umar Ibrahim Vadillo, The Fallacy of the “Islamic Bank,” 
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Delphi/6588/bfallacy.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008). 
 108. Marla Dickerson, The Price of Piety in Islam, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at 
A1. 
 109. See Economics A-Z: Interest, Economist.com, http://www.economist.com/resea 
rch/Economics/searchActionTerms.cfm?query=interest (last visited Jan. 30, 2008). 
 110. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 8. 
 111. See Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 1. 
 112. Viverito, supra note 4, at 146-47. 
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mortgagees replace traditional mortgages—and their strong common 
law protections—with novel alternatives marketed toward a specific 
class of borrowers. 
A.  The Net Lease and Murabaha Are Equitable Mortgages 
To determine whether these proposals satisfy this basic concern, 
this Article analyzes the Net Lease and the murabaha using the same 
factors that courts of equity apply in deciding whether a particular 
financing arrangement is an equitable mortgage.113  Based on the 
information provided within the OCC’s interpretative letters, the Net 
Lease and the murabaha proposal should be treated as equitable 
mortgages because the underlying substance of each transaction is a debt 
secured with real property.114  Both agreements create an obligation for 
the borrower, and if the borrower defaults, the lender can seize the home 
to recover the loaned amount.115  Furthermore, the lender records the 
transaction in conformity with GAAP, as a traditional mortgagee would, 
and reports the earnings as interest income for tax purposes,116 giving 
credence to the contention that these transactions are mortgages.  
Moreover, UBK and the proposing lender in Interpretative Letter No. 
867 argued that the borrowers will be able to deduct some portion of 
their payments as interest, as traditional mortgagors are entitled to do.117  
Thus, both the Net Lease and the murabaha create a mortgagor-
mortgagee relationship in which an underlying debt exists. 
In both the Net Lease and murabaha, the borrower retains 
possession, unless and until he defaults and the mortgagee forecloses.118  
Under both proposals, the borrower acts as a traditional mortgagor, with 
responsibility for the utilities, homeowner’s insurance, property taxes, 
repairs and renovations.119  Furthermore, the borrower may improve the 
 113. See supra Part I. 
 114. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 115. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2; Interpretive Letter No. 867, 
supra note 95, at 5. 
 116. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 9; Interpretive Letter No. 867, 
supra note 95, at 6. 
 117. See Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 6. 
 118. Cf. Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 95, at 2; Interpretive Letter No. 867, 
supra note 95, at 5. 
 119. Cf. Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2; Interpretive Letter No. 867, 
supra note 95, at 4. 
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property, repay the debt early, and sell the property.120  The proposing 
lenders, like traditional lenders, cannot regain possession of the property 
until the borrower’s interest has been foreclosed, either by the expiration 
of the redemption period in the Net Lease or by way of judicial 
foreclosure in the murabaha.  Lastly, the most telling similarity between 
the Net Lease and murabaha borrowers and traditional mortgagors is 
that the Net Lease and murabaha borrowers pay a premium for the use 
of another’s capital, just like traditional interest-paying mortgagors. 
The installment land contract, which the Restatement considers to 
be a mortgage,121 can be analogized to the Net Lease.  Under the 
Restatement definition, an installment land contract—also referred to as 
a contract for deed—entitles a purchaser to possession of the fee, but 
conditions the vendor’s delivery of title on the successful performance 
of the agreement.122  UBK’s proposal achieves substantially the same 
outcome as an installment land contract because UBK retains title to the 
encumbered property until the borrower repays the debt.123  
Furthermore, UBK’s proposal allows it to unilaterally determine 
whether the borrower has defaulted on the note; it may thus regain 
possession to the property without foreclosing the borrower’s equity of 
redemption.  In light of the Restatement, therefore, the Net Lease is a 
veritable installment land contract. 
Although the ‘installment land contract’ label fits the Net Lease, the 
chancellors cannot attach the same appellation to the murabaha.  By 
contrast, the murabaha proposal expressly states that the lender does not 
retain possession of the title; instead, the lender records the title in the 
name of the borrower and lists himself as holding a first mortgage.124  
Under the facts presented to the OCC, the vendor does not defer delivery 
until the successful satisfaction of the underlying debt125 and, therefore, 
 120. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2; Interpretive Letter No. 867, 
supra note 95, at 4. 
 121. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.4 (b). This alternative approach assumes 
the state in which the transaction occurs has adopted the Restatement’s treatment of 
installment land contracts. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See supra Part III.A; Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2. 
 124. Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 4. 
 125. Cf. id.  Note, the Interpretive Letter does not expressly say the delivery would 
not be delayed until full satisfaction of the debt.  The closest inference is that the 
proposal largely resembles a conventional mortgage. See id. 
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the equity courts should not designate murabaha as installment land 
contracts. 
Clearly, any examination of the Net Lease or murabaha shows that 
these arrangements are tantamount to mortgages.  Accordingly, these 
borrowers ought to be entitled to the same protections as traditional 
mortgagors, including the equitable right of redemption.  The court of 
equity’s next step is to determine whether either of the proposed 
financing arrangements are clogs on the equity of redemption. 126
B.  UBK’s Net Lease Proposal May Clog the Mortgagor’s 
Equity of Redemption 
UBK’s Net Lease is an impermissible clog on the equity of 
redemption in non-strict foreclosure states.  Under the Net Lease 
Agreement, the lessee has a specific time frame to cure the default and, 
in the event the default is not cured, UBK may unilaterally treat the 
home as if acquired in foreclosure.127  This situation is analogous to 
Illustration 2 of Section 3.1 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: 
“Mortgagor agrees that her right to redeem under this mortgage shall 
terminate four months after mortgagee declares a default under this 
mortgage.”128  In the UBK Net Lease, the lessee loses his right to 
redeem after a stated period of time without the benefit of a 
foreclosure.129  Therefore, the Net Lease is an impermissible clog on the 
borrower’s equity of redemption. 
Interestingly, there is a variation of UBK’s Net Lease circulating in 
the market called an ijara wa-iqtina.  The ijara wa-iqtina is similar in all 
discernible respects to the Net Lease except that the borrower has an 
option to purchase the home at the end of the lease term.130  At first 
glance the existence of the option does not exacerbate the clog problem, 
because it is the mortgagor—and not the mortgagee—who has the 
option to purchase the land.  Moreover, if the roles were reversed, the 
transaction would clearly be an example of a clog, since the mortgagor 
 126. The following arguments assume that the assumption that the Net Lease and 
murabaha should be treated as equitable mortgages. 
 127. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2. 
 128. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at cmt. b, illus. 2. 
 129. See Interpretive Letter No. 806, supra note 69, at 2. 
 130. See Knoll, supra note 61, at 16 (citing Tarek Zaher & Kabir Hassan, A 
Comparative Literature Survey of Islamic Finance, in 5 FINANCIAL MARKETS, 
INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 155, 160 (2001)). 
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would convey the option contemporaneously with the mortgage.131  This 
Net Lease-variant is not necessarily acceptable because the ijara wa-
iqtina turns the option on its head, however.  In order to be valid, an 
option must have independent consideration;132 here, the mortgagee is 
essentially charging a fee for the mortgagor to have the right to redeem 
his property at the end of the lease period.  With the exception of the 
mortgagor’s option, the ijara wa-iqtina is the same as the Net Lease and 
should be treated accordingly as an equitable mortgage.  Since the equity 
of redemption is a fundamental right of the mortgagor and zealously 
guarded by the equitable courts,133 the mortgagor should not be required 
to pay an additional sum for that right.  By requiring an additional step 
of exercising the option for the mortgagor to redeem the property, the 
mortgagee has created an impermissible clog on the equity of 
redemption.  Accordingly, the equity courts should invalidate the option. 
C.  The Murabaha is Not a Clog on the Equity of Redemption 
In contrast with the Net Lease, the murabaha is not a clog on the 
equity of redemption because the lender is not entitled to take possession 
of the home until the equity court has foreclosed the borrower’s right to 
redeem.  The murabaha borrower enjoys the same property rights and 
responsibilities as traditional mortgagors.134  Unlike in Net Lease 
transactions, the murabaha lender does not retain legal title to the land, 
but rather records the title in the land records in the name of the 
borrower, while listing itself as holding a first mortgage.135  If the 
borrower defaults under the murabaha, the lender cannot reenter the 
property until it provides notice of default and then forecloses the equity 
of redemption period, either through a trustee’s or sheriff’s sale.136
The most significant difference between the murabaha and Net 
Lease lender is that the murabaha lender cannot act unilaterally in 
determining when it may regain possession of the mortgaged property.  
Thus, in all material respects the murabaha confers the same bundle of 
property rights as traditional mortgages and is functionally and legally 
equivalent to an equitable mortgage.  As such, the mortgage alternative 
 131. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3.1(b). 
 132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981). 
 133. See supra Part III.A. 
 134. See supra Part III.A; Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 4-5. 
 135. See Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 4-5. 
 136. See id. at 5. 
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proposed in Interpretive Letter No. 867 adequately protects the 
mortgagor’s equitable right to redeem the property. 
IV.  AMELIORATING THE OBSTACLES PRESENTED BY THE NET LEASE 
AND MURABAHA 
The potential danger of relinquishing common law rights is not 
limited to the specific instances of UBK’s Net Lease or Islamic 
borrowers, but rather extends to all borrowers who might be attracted to 
“religious friendly” mortgage alternatives.  A nefarious lender could 
peddle fallacious arrangements to low-income, unsophisticated, and 
divinely obedient borrowers—whether Muslim or not—in the hope that 
they would be unaware of the protections bestowed on them by the 
common law.  There should be greater concern that, under the pretense 
of religious flexibility, inimical lenders could seek to manipulate pious 
borrowers out of their equity of redemption or disguise higher interest 
rates as “rent” or “mark up profit.” 
A.  Saving the Net Lease Proposal Through Contract Rights 
The fact that the Net Lease might serve as a clog on the equity of 
redemption should not be fatal to its enforceability.  The Net Lease can 
be saved by reforming the default provision to state explicitly that the 
lessee has the right to redeem the property at any time before a judicial 
foreclosure.  While it could be costly and inconvenient for UBK and 
other lenders to seek a judicial foreclosure, that path may ultimately 
prove less costly than litigating claims asserting a clog on the lessee’s 
equitable right of redemption.  Given the close judicial scrutiny of 
arrangements claiming to not be mortgages, the assertion that the Net 
Lease is not a mortgage might fall on deaf ears. 
B.  Adding Clarity and Finality to the Murabaha 
While the murabaha is not a clog, it is not without its shortcomings.  
The OCC proposal is unclear as to what amount a mortgagor will have 
to pay to redeem his property from default.137  Since the interest is 
tacked on to the principal amount at the start of the loan,138 will the 
 137. Cf. Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 2-4. 
 138. Cf. Interpretive Letter No. 867, supra note 95, at 3 (stating that the murabaha 
profit is typically based on a recognized interest rate index, e.g., LIBOR). 
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murabaha mortgagor have to pay the entire remaining principal amount 
in the event of a default? If this is the case, he will be paying more than 
a traditional mortgagor who is only required to pay the amount of 
principal and accrued interest due at the time of default.  In other words, 
the murabaha borrower will essentially be paying a substantial premium 
to redeem his property.  Consequently, the murabaha changes into a 
partial clog and the borrower will receive a worse deal than a traditional 
mortgagor.  Furthermore, if the murabaha borrower must pay the entire 
cost-plus-profit amount, the lender will receive a substantial windfall 
which has yet to accrue under traditional accounting and economic 
principles. 
The price of piety should not require religious mortgagors to pay 
substantially more than secular mortgagors.  The murabaha’s 
shortcomings may be corrected by attaching a schedule to the agreement 
that illustrates what amount would be necessary to cure a default at any 
given installment.  It could be based on a simple amortizing schedule 
that would reflect the interest earned as of the date of default.  The 
schedule adds finality to the agreement, provides the mortgagee with an 
equitable amount of interest, and relieves the mortgagor from 
shouldering a higher burden than a traditional curing mortgagor.  
Alternatively, the murabaha contract language could devise a formula 
that serves essentially the same purpose as the schedule to avoid the 
specter of interest.  The notion that a defaulting Islamic mortgagor 
should have to pay more than a traditional mortgagor to redeem his 
property because of religious adherence is untenable in a nation that 
prides itself on free exercise of religion. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to explore whether it is possible for an 
expanding segment of the population to remain true to their religious 
beliefs while living the American dream.  By examining the historical 
aspects and rationales underlying one of the longest-standing pillars of 
mortgage law, this Article sought to address a subtle yet monumentally 
important concern with a relatively new financing vehicle.  While the 
proposals submitted to the OCC do not perfectly meet the rigors of 
common law mortgage protections, courts of equity and regulators 
should embrace these Islamic-centered mortgage alternatives in order to 
encourage home ownership and maintain flexibility within the home 
financing market.  Furthermore, the existing imperfections can be cured 
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through minimal revision of the Net Lease and murabaha.  Through 
awareness of the mortgage alternatives entering the market, courts of 
equity can more effectively balance their fervent safeguarding of the 
mortgagor’s common law protections with the sound public policy of 
being amenable to novel approaches to allow theistic mortgagors to live 
the American dream. 
 
